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The New Evil Demon problem is a problem for externalist theories of jus-
tification, and has been a subject of ongoing debate since it was introduced
in 1983 by Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen.1 Lehrer and Cohen ask us to:
Imagine that, unknown to us, our cognitive processes, those in-
volved in perception, memory and inference, are rendered un-
reliable by the actions of a powerful demon or malevolent sci-
entist. It would follow on reliabilist views that under such con-
ditions the beliefs generated by those processes would not be
justified. This result is unacceptable. The truth of the demon
hypothesis also entails that our experiences and our reasonings
are just what they would be if our cognitive processes were re-
liable, and, therefore, that we would be just as well justified in
believing what we do if the demon hypothesis were true as if it
were false.
—Lehrer & Cohen (1983), p. 192
In other words, Lehrer and Cohen ask us to imagine that the subjective,
first-personal character of our mental lives is the same as it normally is,
but that we are being radically deceived, so that (nearly?) none of our be-
liefs are connected to the world in the way they normally are, in the way
that provides us with knowledge of the world.2 Nevertheless, Lehrer and
Cohen maintain, such a deceived subject would still be justified. Let us
call duplicates of the sort Lehrer and Cohen are imagining perspectival du-
plicates.
1Thanks to Nic Bommarito, Cameron Boult, Brian Cutter, Julien Dutant, John Greco,
Christoph Kelp, Rachel McKinney, Alan Millar, Ernest Sosa, Kurt Sylvan, and Alex
Worsnip.
2See also Cohen (1984).
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The internalism/ externalism distinction is made in many different ways,
but one way to make it is to distinguish those who think that disconnection
from the world in the evil demon scenario precludes justification (external-
ists) from those who do not (internalists). Externalists hold that one’s reli-
able connection to the world is all that matters for justification; internalists
hold that what matters is the subject’s perspective.
Many externalists reject the internalist’s claim that subjects in the evil
demon scenario have a positive epistemic standing in common with normal
subjects, maintaining that positive epistemic standing is entirely a matter
of how one is connected to the world. This, however, has well-known prob-
lems. For example, let us start with someone who is clearly epistemically
virtuous—someone who seeks out proper evidence on questions of interest,
reasons thoroughly and effectively about these questions, and persistently
develops and hones her intellectual abilities in the service of acquiring and
maintaining knowledge of herself and the world. Let us also take someone
who is clearly epistemically vicious—someone who is intellectually lazy,
who indulges in wishful thinking and bad reasoning that supports what-
ever she wants to believe, who refuses to acquire new ways of thinking or
reasoning despite having good evidence that her current methods are mis-
leading, and so on.
Now, we imagine that perspectival duplicates of our two subjects are
in evil demon scenarios. Are these duplicates epistemically on a par with
each other? Intuitively not: unfortunate circumstances make both of their
belief-forming methods equally completely unreliable, but that does not
not erase all epistemic differences.3 The duplicate of our virtuous epis-
temic agent is still more virtuous than the duplicate of our vicious epis-
temic agent, for she is still reasoning better. Internalists take this kind of
consequence to be a reductio of the externalist position—epistemic stand-
ing must be the sort of thing that differentiates between these two perspec-
tival duplicates.4
Internalists are in large part concerned with trying to capture the dif-
ference that our perspective on the world and on our own abilities makes
3Here and throughout I will ask whether the beliefs of an epistemic subject are justi-
fied/rational or not and why. This is not meant to be read as a question about all the beliefs
of a subject. I assume that virtuous duplicates (and agents) are capable of failing to be-
lieve from epistemic competence from time to time, and these cases are not of interest here.
Likewise, mutatis mutandis for other agents. We are considering here the epistemic status
of beliefs that are exercises of epistemic competences or other propensities to believe, and it
is only for the sake of concision that I talk about “the beliefs” of certain kinds of epistemic
agents.
4See Cohen (1984), p. 283 for discussion of this kind of case.
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to our epistemic standing. Without it, they worry, our epistemic standing
becomes too divorced from what makes us human, too much a matter of
a mere machine functioning properly, rather than a person grappling with
questions. I agree. An adequate theory of our epistemic standing must take
into account our subjective perspectives on the world, how things seem to
us, what considerations we are bearing in mind, how we are trying to rea-
son, and whether we are properly committed to knowing how the world is,
even if it is not always in our favor.
However, the traditional internalist account of justification has its seri-
ous shortfalls too. It fails to capture the sense in which our virtuous epis-
temic agent is epistemically better off than her perspectival counterpart—
for one, she is actually competent. She doesn’t just mean well, she reliably
and effectively acquires and maintains knowledge about her environment.
Even when she goes wrong and falsely believes, her errors are of an entirely
different magnitude than the errors her perspectival duplicate makes. This
difference should be reflected in our account of epistemic standing.
One strategy for solving this problem which has seemed attractive to
many is to allow for more than just one kind of positive epistemic standing
that falls short of knowledge. Perhaps we should separate the external-
ist notion of justification (what I’ll henceforth call “justification”) from the
internalist notion of justification (“rationality”), letting everyone agree to
disagree. As things stand, however, this move has serious costs. First, many
internalists and externalists hold that knowledge can be analyzed in terms
of justification, truth, and some anti-Gettier feature.5 For such views the
question arises: which kind of justification should serve in such an anal-
ysis? If it is the externalist kind, why does the internalist kind also seem
necessary for knowledge? What work is it doing in our epistemology then?
(And vice versa.) What do these two kinds of epistemic standing have to
do with each other? Why do justification and rationality both count as pos-
itive epistemic statuses? Are there more positive epistemic statuses? Why
stop at these two? Why not let a thousand flowers bloom?
One might think these issues are avoided by those adopting a knowledge-
first approach, but at least initially the problem becomes even worse. Knowledge-
firsters claim that knowledge is not analyzable in terms of justification (or
rationality) but is rather epistemically fundamental, and all epistemic sta-
tuses are derivative from the epistemic status of knowledge.6 But now we
5This project clearly motivates both Lehrer and Cohen.
6Knowledge-firsters differ on whether they claim knowledge is conceptually or meta-
physically unanalyzable in terms of other epistemic and mental features. Here and else-
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have not one but two kinds of positive epistemic status that need account-
ing for in terms of knowledge. Knowledge-firsters either have to settle for
a less explanatory epistemic theory than belief-firsters or they have their
work cut out for them. Being a knowlege-firster myself, this much mystery
makes me pretty uneasy.
Whew. This is where the debate is right now, and it is no wonder that
many externalists (both knowledge-firsters and belief-firsters) have turned
to the idea of an excuse to try to get out of the trouble.7 On this view, only
beliefs that are knowledge have positive epistemic status at all, but there
are other cases where a subject may be blameless, or excusable, for having
a belief. Evil demon scenarios, they claim, are cases of this sort. However,
this strategy doesn’t fix the problem.
First, it doesn’t explain why the subject is epistemically excusable in
virtue of being a perspectival duplicate. What is it about our perspectives
that makes a difference to blameworthiness?8 Often this is assumed, but it
cannot be in this context. Here we return to the original internalist call to
make our humanity relevant to epistemology—to make our interests and
goals have a role to play in our epistemic lives. What is it, then, about our
perspectives that provides us with excuses? Moreover, why do our first-
personal perspectives make a difference to excusability despite not making
a difference to genuine epistemic standing? More needs to be said here than
has been done to date.9
where I am primarily interested in metaphysical questions. See Ichikawa & Jenkins
(manuscript) for a helpful discussion of the diversity of knowledge-first views.
7Williamson (this volume), Littlejohn (2012).
8E.g. Littlejohn (2012) argues that evil demon subjects still “pursue their epistemic
ends rationally and responsibly” (59) and that this provides them with an excuse for be-
lieving as they do. Why is it, however, that evil demon subjects have these virtues despite
being wholly unreliable, and why should these provide one with an excuse for not hav-
ing genuine justification? As , Littlejohn himself himself agrees (58), the strategy treating
our world as the normal world for any subject in any world (as Williamson (this volume),
Comesan˜a (2002), and others do), is an undue privileging of our own situation rather than
a genuine explanation of the norms applicable in the evil demon world.
9As my main aim in this paper is to offer my own solution, I cannot defend this claim in
detail. However, to better see the kind of worries at issue, I will briefly consider Williamson
(this volume)’s proposed solution to the new evil demon problem by appealing to derivative
norms. He argues that although evil demon subjects violate the primary epistemic norm—
believe only what you know—they can satisfy the secondary and tertiary norms of having a
general disposition to believe only what one knows and doing what a person who had such
a disposition would do in such a situation. Satisfying these norms, he claims, is sufficient
for having an excuse for violating the primary norm. He does not, however, explain (i) why
certain secondary and tertiary norms are generated by a primary norm, (ii) why the virtuous
duplicate complies with these derivative norms, given that her world is thoroughly unlike
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Second, proponents of this strategy also use it to account for cases in
which we have a justified false belief in normal environments.10 They thus
fail to account for the epistemic difference between our virtuous agent who
exercises her epistemic competence and yet believes falsely on a particular
occasion, and her perspectival duplicate. Lastly and most importantly, this
kind of strategy fails to explain the way in which the perspectival duplicate
of our virtuous epistemic agent is in some sense also virtuous. It is not
merely that she is less in the wrong than the vicious duplicate; she is doing
something epistemically right, at least, and we should be able to give an
account of what it is.11
It’s time for a new strategy. In what follows, I will extend my direct
virtue epistemology (2015a; 2015b) to explain how a knowledge-first frame-
work can account for two kinds of positive epistemic standing, one tracked
by externalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate lacks justification,
the other tracked by internalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate
has justification, and moreover that such justification is not enjoyed by the
vicious duplicate. It also explains what these kinds of epistemic standing
have to do with each other. In short, I will argue that all justified beliefs are
good candidates for knowledge, and are such because they are exercises of
competences to know. However, there are two importantly different senses
in which a belief may be a good candidate for knowledge, one correspond-
ing to an externalist kind of justification and the other corresponding to an
internalist one.
In section 1, I discuss the New Evil Demon problem in more depth, and
argue that externalists cannot easily dismiss it. In section 2, I review some
core features of my direct virtue epistemology and explain how it already
delivers an externalist kind of justification. In section 3, I explain what
kind of positive epistemic standing perspectival duplicates have, and why
this epistemic standing is dependent on the normative status of knowledge.
In section 4, I show how this normative status may be explained using the
ours (he just claims that our world is the world of evaluation for normal scenarios (p. 14)),
and (iii) why compliance with the derivative norms should provide one with an excuse for
violating a primary norm. Such a task is necessary for a full account of epistemic excuse
and seems just as difficult as that of explaining how there can be two kinds of positive
epistemic status.
10See, e.g. Williamson (this volume).
11Some sophisticated versions of the view might have something to say here. E.g., Lit-
tlejohn (2012) admits that there is a sense of justification that corresponds to the internalist
sense of justification (personal justification) and claims that evil demon subjects can have it.
However, we want a unified account of epistemic standing, and Littlejohn does not provide
one.
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tools of virtue epistemology. In section 5, I show how the account solves the
new evil demon problem in a more satisfactory way than existing accounts.
We end up with a view of knowledge, justification, and rationality that is
plausible, motivated, and theoretically unified.
1 What Exactly Is the New Evil Demon Problem?
The New Evil Demon Problem asks us to consider a scenario in which ev-
erything seems to be the same to us as it normally does, but in which we
are radically deceived by some evil creature with the power to make us un-
dergo such a persistent illusion. For simplicity’s sake, I will consider the
way of filling out the case on which we are, and always have been, brains
in vats which an evil demon has made to have the thoughts, experiences,
etc., we would have if things were normal.12
A normal question for someone with externalist leanings to have at the
very outset is whether such a scenario is even possible. Sure, I can imagine
being a brain in a vat and having all the same experiences and thoughts as
I do now, but could I actually be one?
An influential line of argument says No. If our experiences, thoughts,
and so on are in part determined by our relations to our environment, then
we couldn’t have the same experiences, thoughts, and so on if we were
brains in vats. Such considerations are typically brought up to counter
skeptical worries about our knowledge of the world.13 We appeal to the
idea that what our mental states are about is at least in part determined by
our relations to the world in order to rule out the possibility that we could
be radically deceived.14
Adopting inspiration from this approach, the hardline externalist about
justification might then push the point here. If I couldn’t experience or
think about the same things in the evil demon scenario as I do now, then I
wouldn’t have the same experiences or thoughts. Things wouldn’t seem to
be the same to me. Thus the brain in a vat scenario is not one in which I
form the same beliefs on the basis of the same experiences in the same ways
but now these ways are highly unreliable. The new evil demon scenario is
12This construal ignores complications that arise from recent envatment. These compli-
cations won’t change the moral of the story.
13See Putnam (1981).
14There are of course questions to ask about this strategy (e.g. see Brueckner (1986) for
plausible worries), but the point here is not to show that the externalist has a convincing
response to skepticism. Rather, I just wish to point out that it is a move someone with
externalist leanings (both in semantics and in epistemology) might plausibly make.
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thus metaphysically impossible, and so not a counterexample to external-
ism. We can happily disregard troubling intuitions about such cases.
I think that this response to the internalist’s challenge misses the point.
All that matters, in order for the evil demon scenario to pose a problem for
externalism about justification, is for it to be conceivable, not possible. The
point of raising the scenario is not that externalism fails to be extension-
ally adequate, but that it wholly credits reliability with being responsible
for epistemic standing. The scenario is being used to teach us that beliefs
have certain kinds of epistemic standing in virtue of certain properties of
our perspectival lives—if our perspectival lives could be preserved while
our reliable connection to the world were severed, some things would still
be going epistemically right with us. The virtuous perspectival duplicate
would still be reasoning in the right sort of way—she would believe prop-
erly on the basis of her experience, she would engage in proper inferences,
ask the right questions, and so on. She would have a certain epistemic
standing that is preserved because it is determined by certain perspectival
features of her mental life. It is irrelevant whether one could, as a matter of
metaphysical possibility, have this aspect of one’s mental life preserved in
the absence of reliable connections to the environment. What matters for
the epistemic internalist is that any contributions that reliable connections
to the environment make to epistemic standing are made via their giving
rise to the perspectival aspects of our mental lives.
This is a point that is often overlooked and so it is worth making again:
sometimes, all you need in order for a case to make a point is for it to con-
ceptually separate two properties. This can show that intuitively certain
properties A are responsible for epistemic standing N (or whatever philo-
sophically interesting feature you’re interested in) and other properties B
are not. It doesn’t matter whether the A properties could exist without the
B properties. Perhaps the B properties are metaphysically necessary for the
A properties. But even if that is so, if our intuitions are on the right track,
the B properties contribute to N only via grounding the A properties.
Accordingly, the internalist can claim that content externalism is beside
the point. Perhaps there couldn’t be radical deception scenarios where I
form the belief that I’m sitting under a tree on the basis of my experience
of doing so. Nevertheless, when we imagine the case, we judge that the
subject is doing something right, whereas someone who judges that there
are pink elephants in the room on the basis of the same experience is not
doing something right. That is all we need to suppose in order for the evil
demon scenario to generate a problem for externalism.
A solution to the new evil demon problem, then, will explain how there
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is a kind of epistemic standing that is not directly determined by our reli-
able hook-up to the world, but rather by our mental, first-personal, per-
spectives: how things seem to us, how we are reasoning, what we are aim-
ing at when we are reasoning in certain ways or asking certain questions.
However, a solution need not appeal to only features that are present in
the evil demon scenario. If the scenario is, as seems highly plausible to
me, metaphysically impossible, then our account of which epistemic agents
have the perspectival features responsible for rationality may indeed ap-
peal to how the subject is related to the world in normal cases. We should
accept the internalist point that mental features make a direct difference to
epistemic standing without conceding that such mental features are soleley
determined by what is inside the head.
That the mental features responsible for internalist justification do de-
pend on what is in the world can be illustrated by introducing a third per-
spectival duplicate: a merely well-meaning one. A merely well-meaning
agent values knowledge and tries to form and maintain beliefs in knowl-
edgeable ways, but systematically and widely fails. She doesn’t have a good
sense of what considerations bear on questions of interest; her reasoning is
not logical, or in accordance with proper induction or abduction; she thinks
that complex explanations (other things being equal) are more likely to be
correct than simpler ones, and so on. Nevertheless, she has no idea of the
extent of her shortcomings. (Too many of us are often in the position of
meaning well with respect to some aim, being nevertheless incompetent at
it, and having little or no idea that this is the case.)
To make the comparison between the virtuous and merely well-meaning
agents more concrete, consider a merely well-meaning moral and epistemic
agent with respect to racial justice. This person values racial equality, but
ignores evidence that police statistically treat black and white citizens dif-
ferently, instead focusing on statistics such as those suggesting that black
people are more likely to commit crimes. She has a friend who discusses
with her worries that her black son might have a dangerous encounter with
police when he is out with his friends at night. Our agent, in trying to con-
sole her, says, “Don’t worry; as long as he doesn’t do anything wrong he’ll
be fine”.15
Although our agent means well, and values racial justice and knowl-
edge, she doesn’t properly value either of them. In believing and acting as
15See Dotson (2011) for an excellent virtue-theoretic critique of this kind of practice.
This is a case where the audience is testimonially incompetent with respect to race (in
Dotson’s sense). See esp. pp. 246-249 for discussion of a similar example.
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she does, she fails to manifest proper respect for what it takes to get onto
the facts in this domain. Meaning well just isn’t good enough.
Of course, our merely well-meaning epistemic agent is highly unreli-
able. But her epistemic shortcomings do not stop there. Her perspectival
duplicate in the evil demon scenario is intuitively worse off than the vir-
tuous duplicate. This is so despite the fact that from her perspective, she
cannot tell the difference between her situation and a virtuous one. Her po-
sition is subjectively indiscriminable, and yet she fails to believe rationally.
Meaning well does not make it so: merely meaning to believe rationally
does not thereby make one believe rationally.16
If our intuitions about the evil demon scenario are to be taken seriously,
we are now confronted with the challenge of explaining the difference in
epistemic standing between the virtuous and merely well-meaning dupli-
cates in mental terms, not just in terms of reliability. This issue faces all
theories of justification, and it is more difficult to solve than is often ac-
knowledged.17 For example, consider this passage by Cohen:
Beliefs produced by good reasoning are paradigm cases of justi-
fied belief and beliefs arrived at through fallacious or arbitrary
reasoning are paradigm cases of unjustified belief. Whether or
not reasoning results in false belief, even if this happens more
often than not, is irrelevant to the question of whether the rea-
soning is good. To maintain otherwise would be on a par with
confusing truth and validity.
—Cohen (1984), p. 283.
Here Cohen suggests that the question of whether an agent reasons
rationally is orthogonal to the question of whether she reasons reliably.
But that is not so. Deductive reasoning, after all, is plausibly epistemi-
cally valuable precisely because it is conditionally (perfectly) reliable. Thus
truth-connectedness, perplexingly, does seem to matter for internalist jus-
tification. Moreover and more importantly, the majority of our belief for-
mation and retention does not rely on deductive reasoning, but on the basis
of heuristics, induction, and abduction. These kinds of reasoning are not
plausibly reduced to logical reasoning; instead, what makes these ways of
16I here put aside views that entail the opposite conclusion, such as plausibly Foley
(1987). I think we can respect the core internalist insight without giving it up.
17Cohen (1984) is clear that we need a theory of what makes good reasoning good on the
first order.
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forming beliefs rational seems to depend on whether or not they are ways
of reliably getting onto the facts.18
What originally seemed like a clear-cut distinction between externalist
kinds of epistemic standing—which have to do with being appropriately
hooked up to the world—and internalist kinds of epistemic standing—
which have to do with having the appropriate subjective mental life—is
starting to look much less clear. How might we articulate what features of
the subject’s mental life determine internalist justification without collaps-
ing into a form of externalism, or ending up with the unpalatable conse-
quence that merely meaning to believe rationally makes it so? If we can
answer this question, we can solve the new evil demon problem in a truly
satisfying way—in a way that does justice to both internalist and exter-
nalist insights. In the rest of the paper I will show how my direct virtue
epistemology can be extended to do just this.
2 Externalist Justification for Direct Virtue Epistemology
The epistemic theory I defend is a knowledge-first virtue epistemology.
It shares with other kinds of reliabilist virtue epistemology the idea that
knowledge is an achievement that is due to our epistemic competence, and
that epistemic competences are by nature reliable at accomplishing what
they are competences to do. However, it is knowledge-first in holding that
epistemic competences are competences to know, rather than to believe
truly, and so the theory is direct in the sense that it claims that the com-
petences responsible for knowledge are competences to do that very thing,
not to do something that falls short of knowledge. Competences to know
must therefore be reliable with respect to knowledge, not just true belief.
Competences to know are reliable but typically fallible; they not only
have exercises that are cases of knowledge (manifestations), but they typi-
cally also have exercises that are constitutively failures to know (degenerate
exercises). This feature of competences is central to the view: instead of
supposing, as belief-firsters do, that epistemic competences are exercised
in a way that is neutral with respect to whether or not they accomplish their
aim, I argue that exercises of epistemic competence always entail either
success or failure.19 The success cases (cases of knowledge) are metaphysi-
cally and explanatorily more fundamental than the failure cases, however.
18Williamson (this volume) also makes this point.
19I hold this to be true for competences more generally. See Miracchi (manuscript ) for
further discussion.
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First, it is essential to epistemic competences that they manifest in cases of
knowledge. It is not essential or necessary for them to be able to have de-
generate exercises: reliability with respect to knowledge might be perfect,
e.g., such as some claim is the case with the Cogito.20
Moreover, degenerate exercises are only exercises of competences be-
cause their conditions deviate from manifestation conditions; thus degen-
erate exercises of competence depend on manifestations for their status as
epistemic states at all. Being an exercise of competence, rather than being
the most epistemically fundamental case, is instead a disjunctive kind—
that of either manifesting or degenerately exercising one’s competence—
and it is thus metaphysically and explanatorily dependent on manifesta-
tions and degenerate exercises.21
Nevertheless, the category of exercise of epistemic competence does inter-
esting theoretical work. Beliefs have a certain kind of positive epistemic
standing in virtue of being members of that category: exercises of com-
petence are as a matter of their nature likely to be cases of knowledge.
If knowledge is the fundamental epistemic good—qua the achievement of
the epistemic domain—and reliability with respect to a good is therefore
derivatively a good of that kind, then reliability with respect to knowledge
is an epistemic good. A belief is justified in the externalist sense, then, just
in case it is an exercise of a competence to know.
According to direct virtue epistemology, not only is justification meta-
physically and explanatorily dependent on knowledge, so is belief. Beliefs
constitutively aim at knowledge.22 That is, beliefs are just the kind of men-
tal state that aim at knowledge as a matter of their nature. We may now put
the point as follows: As the performances that aim at knowledge, beliefs
are the candidates for knowledge.23 However, rather than being a unified
kind, beliefs admit of importantly different varieties, in accordance with
the facts in virtue of which they have knowledge as their aim. In cases of
justified belief, it is because the performance is an exercise of competence
(a manifestation or a degenerate exercise) that it aims at knowledge, and so
20Sosa (2007), pp. 16-17 also makes the suggestion that the Cogito should be thought of
as a case of a manifestation of a perfectly reliable competence.
21Why do I call exercises of competence a disjunctive kind? Isn’t that an oxymoron? As
we’ll see, some beliefs can have normative statuses in virtue of being exercises of compe-
tence. Thus although the exercise of competence is a disjunctive notion, instances of it have
properties in virtue of being a member of that kind. Thus kind-talk is warranted, at least in
my view. Thanks to Neil Mehta for pressing me on this question.
22Bird (2007) and Sutton (2007) also hold this view.
23In the sense I am using the term “candidate” here, cases of knowledge are also candi-
dates for knowledge.
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is a belief. This is just a special case of the idea that in exercising a compe-
tence to A, the agent aims to A.) But there are other ways for a performance
to aim at knowing. These are unjustified beliefs.24
We may now put the view about justification slightly differently (though
I think equivalently) to what I propose in Miracchi (2015a). According to
the theory on offer, an agent’s belief that p is externalist-justified just in
case it is, as a matter of its nature, a good candidate for knowledge in the
probabilistic sense. Exercises of competence as such (a) aim at knowledge,
and so are beliefs, and (b) are likely to be cases of knowledge. Exercise of
competence are thus as a matter of their nature good candidates for knowl-
edge in the probabilistic sense.
I now wish to expand this conception of justification and hold that a
belief is epistemically justified—in either the externalist or the internalist
sense—just in case it is a good candidate for knowledge as a matter of its
nature. Moreover, a belief is a good candidate for knowledge if and only
if it is an exercise of epistemic competence. Miracchi (2015a) shows how
exercises of epistemic competence are good candidates for knowledge in an
externalist sense. I will now argue that they are good candidates for knowl-
edge in an internalist sense: all exercises of epistemic competence thereby
meet a mental requirement for being knowledge. In the next section I will
explain what that mental requirement is, and in section 4 I will explain why
all and only exercises of epistemic competence meet that requirement.
3 Rational Believing Is A Kind of Properly Valuing Knowledge
A promising place to start is by looking at some insights from recent work
on derivative value, and those in epistemology who are already applying
it to the epistemic domain. Several people have argued recently, perhaps
most notably Thomas Hurka (2001), that some acts and attitudes are valu-
able because they instantiate or manifest proper ways of valuing something
valuable.25 For example, it is not only good to provide food and shelter to
the homeless, it is also good to value the acts of providing food and shel-
24See Miracchi (2015a) pp. 50-51 for further discussion.
25This has been of particular interest in the literature on fitting attitude theories of value,
for those theories try to analyze (certain) values in terms of being worthy of certain atti-
tudes. Regardless of whether this project is on the right track, it has reminded us that
certain acts are valuable because they manifest proper ways of valuing the valuable. The
articulation of the view in terms of manifestation of a proper way of valuing is due to Kurt
Sylvan (manuscript), but I think it is a useful way of clarifying explaining Hurka’s original
view, rather than a development of the view.
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ter to the homeless—perhaps by writing a journalistic piece about an or-
ganization that does so effectively. Perhaps such writing will increase the
number of donations, and so increase the number of homeless people given
food and shelter, and so be instrumentally good. However, even if the ar-
ticle were to fail in this regard, it would nevertheless be good merely for
the reason that it manifests the author’s valuing the providing of food and
shelter to the homeless.
Kurt Sylvan (manuscript) recently pursues this line of thought in pro-
viding an account of epistemic value, where truth is the fundamental epis-
temic value, and cases of believing that properly value the truth are thereby
derivatively (non-instrumentally) valuable. He claims that “beliefs are epis-
temically valuable because they manifest certain ways to place value on ac-
curacy in thought”.26 Sylvan then claims that he can analyze certain epis-
temic normative properties such as rationality, coherence, and knowledge
in terms of different ways of valuing the truth.
While I am less optimistic about being able to account for these epis-
temic normative properties in the way that Sylvan does, I think he is on
the right track in investigating the kind of epistemic standing that the in-
ternalist is getting at when she claims that the subject in the evil demon
scenario is still justified in believing as she does.27 Properly valuing an
epistemic good is clearly something that is inherently first-personal, that
has to do with how we mentally, perspectivally, proceed in our epistemic
inquiries. By placing attention on whether or not the subject properly val-
ues the truth (or knowledge!) in believing as she does, we are placing our
attention on something that is clearly a feature of her mental life.
As this stands however, it won’t quite do, for two reasons. First, I need
to explain why the kind of proper valuing I am claiming is constitutive of
epistemic rationality is plausibly something that all beliefs have, and is not
overly intellectualized.28 Second, it is important to distinguish the kind
of derivative value that beliefs can have from the kind that performances
which are not beliefs can have. For example, one way of valuing knowl-
edge is to create schools. But the act of creating schools, if epistemically
valuable, is valuable in a very different sense from the epistemic value of
believing rationally. It is certainly not epistemically rational in the same
sense that beliefs are epistemically rational. Hurka’s and Sylvan’s accounts,
26Sylvan (manuscript) p. 4.
27Sylvan is clear that he does not mean for such an account to be a contender to a moder-
ate reliabilism, which claims that reliability is an epistemic good; rather he aims to be aug-
menting such a view—accounting for a more internalist kind of positive epistemic standing.
28Hurka and others face an analogous challenge with respect to the moral domain.
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however, do not make this distinction.29
Note that, in this case, analogously to the journalism case above, the
claim is not that writing journal articles or opening schools is epistemically
valuable because it is a way of promoting knowledge, but that it is epistem-
ically valuable because it embodies the proper valuing of knowledge. This
kind of proper valuing, however, is different and more removed from the
kind of proper valuing our beliefs have because we value what it takes to
know in believing as we do. How shall we understand the difference?
4 Competent Perspectives
Virtue epistemology, and in particular my direct virtue epistemology, can
help with both of these issues. First I will take up the question of distin-
guishing the kind of derivative value beliefs can have from other kinds of
derivative value. Then, I will answer the charge of over-intellectualizing
rationality.
According to virtue epistemology, epistemology is a performance do-
main. This means its normativity is structured in terms of certain aims
that are fundamental to the domain, and the agency involved in attaining
those aims. The primary bearers of epistemic value are the performances
that are candidates for being attainments of the fundamental epistemic
aim(s) of the domain. As discussed in the previous section, for direct virtue
epistemology knowledge is the fundamental aim, and beliefs are the per-
formances that are candidates for knowledge. This is why beliefs are the
immediate bearers of epistemic properties.30
Other performances may bear epistemic properties only as they relate
to the performances that are candidates for knowledge. Opening a school
is an example of a performance that is not a candidate for knowledge, and
therefore has epistemic status only at a remove. Opening a school does
not aim at knowledge in virtue of its nature. Only beliefs do that.31 One
who opens a school with the right motives both increases the amount of
knowledge in the world and manifests proper valuing of knowledge, but
not by performing in a way that is itself a candidate for knowledge. Thus,
although it is both instrumentally valuable and manifests proper valuing
29Sylvan does not discuss this problem for his view.
30Epistemic agents too are immediate bearers of epistemic properties, because they are
the ones who achieve knowledge.
31This avoids Berker (2013a,b) style worries. When beliefs are formed or maintained in
the aim of creating further knowledge, they are not aiming at knowledge qua candidates
for knowledge.
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of knowledge, it is epistemically valuable only in a derivative sense.
Within the virtue-theoretic framework I have offered here, we can now
provide a motivated restriction on the kind of proper valuing of knowledge
that is constitutive of epistemic rationality: it is properly valuing knowl-
edge in aiming to know. In other words, the kind of proper valuing we
are after is a kind of practical valuing: A belief is rational just in case the
epistemic agent properly values what it takes to achieve her aim of knowledge in
believing as she does.
Now we can address the other worry for the account, namely that it
over-intellectualizes epistemic rationality. Do we really properly value knowl-
edge as the aim of our performance every time that we know? Of course,
sometimes we know things we would rather not know. We might even wish
that we could allow other more practical considerations to sway us. How-
ever, I think that even in such cases there is a sense in which we properly
value knowledge as the aim of our doxastic performance.
The epistemically virtuous agent does not experience a blind attraction
to believing in a way that is, as a matter of how things turn out, knowledge;
rather, the fact that this is so guides her in her reasoning. In manifesting her
competence, the virtuous epistemic agent is attracted to certain patterns of
reasoning precisely because they are ways of acquiring and maintaining
knowledge. It is precisely because the evidence unequivocally points to p
that one believes p, even when one would rather not do so. The “because”
as I am using it here is not merely causal. It entails a kind of sensitivity,
from the subject’s own perspective, to the fact that to perform in a certain
way is to provide oneself with, or maintain, knowledge.
This is exactly the kind of feature we have been looking for: believing
and reasoning in certain ways because they are ways of knowing suffices for
the agent to properly value knowledge as the aim of belief in believing as
she does. After all, to perform in a certain way because doing so would be
an achievement of one’s aim is plausibly the best way to value what it takes
to achieve one’s aim in performing as one does.
To say that the virtuous epistemic agent is attracted to certain ways of
reasoning because they are ways of acquiring and maintaining knowledge
does not commit one to the claim that the agent believes, or can articulate,
this attraction.32 Nor does it commit one to the claim that the agent has a
desire, or other pro-attitude, to believe in a way that is a way of knowing
distinct from her coming to believe or her maintaining her belief. This
32Note also that if we required knowledge, this would immediately lead to a vicious
regress.
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would over-intellectualize rationality, as has been widely noted.33 Rather,
I am describing what it is to come to believe or maintain one’s belief in a
competent way on the first order. It has an ineliminably perspectival aspect
to it.34
Although this was not the focus of Miracchi (2015a), the sense in which
the subject has an aim to know in exercising her epistemic competence
was always supposed to be perspectival. As opposed to some other virtue
epistemologists such as Ernest Sosa who assimilate the aiming of everyday
belief to biological functioning, for me it is very important that the aim
that is constitutive of belief is mental in a way that the function of a heart
to pump blood is not.35 Rather than thinking of aims to know as biological
or evolutionary, we should think of them as a distinctively mental kind of
directedness.
If we do not, then it is by no means clear that we are dealing with perfor-
mances of the epistemic agent in any important sense. Virtue epistemology,
which was designed to center the agent in our epistemic theorizing, thus
falls prey to the same problems that reliabilism does: it turning us (qua
epistemic beings at least) into mere machines that are reliably hooked up
to the world. We are clearly much more than that, and it is the task of the
naturalistically-minded epistemologist to articulate how this might be the
case.36
Once we have gotten this far, however, the idea that the way in which
we aim at knowing when we manifest our epistemic competence entails
proper valuing of that aim is not far off. In such cases, having the aim
of knowledge in believing as one does is competently aiming for knowl-
edge. It is being drawn to take certain objections seriously, to revise one’s
commitment in light of (seeming) counter-evidence or to undermine that
counter-evidence, and so on. It is being drawn to certain ways of believing
because they are ways of knowing, and that is just what it is to properly
33E.g. see Cohen (1984)’s criticisms of Lehrer. Sylvan (manuscript) is also clear that
understanding rationality to be proper valuing does not commit one to such a view.
34It is plausible that an analogous phenomenon occurs in the moral domain. The vir-
tuous moral agent, in exercising her competence, just is just motivated to do what is right.
She is drawn, first-personally, perspectively, towards an action and in doing so she mani-
fests properly valuing doing what is right.
35See esp. Sosa (2015), p. 20. I think there are many problems with a biological or
evolutionary account of epistemic aims, but this is not the place to discuss them.
36To be clear, the claim is not that we need a non-naturalist or anti-physicalist account
to explain these mental properties. However, acknowledging these mental properties and
their centrality to epistemology is crucial for developing an adequate theory.
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value knowledge as the aim of one’s performance.37 This should allay our
fears that the account over-intellectualizes rationality. Rather, it appeals to
the most basic perspectival-motivational features that are present in any
manifestations of competence that are properly called performances by the
agent.
However, I haven’t yet explained what happens in a case of rationality
that falls short of knowledge. One can only believe in a certain way be-
cause it is a way of knowing if that way of believing is indeed a way of
knowing. What, then, about rational beliefs that fall short of knowledge?
In such cases, we typically imagine a subject situated so that her belief falls
short of knowledge, and yet her case is indiscriminable from one where
she knows; it is for her as if she were acquiring or maintaining knowledge,
even though she is not. But again we must remember that it can’t be indis-
criminability as such that does the trick. Recall our merely well-meaning
agent. Although she believes in a way that is indiscriminable from a way of
knowing, she doesn’t believe rationally. We have to explain what is going
on with the merely rational believer in a way that goes beyond reference to
the indiscriminability of her situation.
Here direct virtue epistemology is again well-poised to provide an an-
swer. As noted above, according to most kinds of virtue epistemology, epis-
temic competences are typically fallible. Certain conditions might pre-
clude agents from achieving their aims, while nevertheless they perform
competently. In such cases the exercise, though degenerate, is still fully
competent. The agent was merely unlucky.38
Moreover, it is plausible that the reason why the rational agent’s sit-
uation is indiscriminable from a case of knowledge is that she exercised
her competence.39 We can think of what happens here as analogous with
perceptual illusions: in cases of illusion, a thing seems to be a certain way
even though it is not. What explains why things look that way are the very
37As an example, consider consider an epistemic case, where an agent competently de-
duces q from p and If p then q, thereby coming to know that q. When the agent is motivated
to infer q, she is properly aiming at knowledge, aiming at knowledge in a way that properly
values what it takes to know. This agent may not have a concept of modus ponens. She
may not be able to tell you that the form of inference is valid. However, as long as it is this
property of the inference that is perspectivally guiding her in believing as she does, she
properly values what it takes to know.
38Of course it behooves an agent to continually try to hone her competences to reduce
the probability that she will be undone by bad luck, but that does not mean that in such
cases the fault for her failure lies with her.
39Presumably, a fault would be with you if you had a sense that you were failing to get
onto the facts.
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same competences that explain why things look the way they are to you in
the good case. Much work in vision science presupposes that this is true.
This is why illusions are so empirically interesting—they reveal something
about how the competences responsible for veridical perception work.40
Similarly, we might think of the rational bad case as a case of epistemic
illusion: a certain way of believing seems to be a way of knowing, and
this is explained by appeal to the same competence that provides you with
knowledge on other occasions. So, although you don’t believe as you do be-
cause so believing is a way of knowing (you can’t, because it’s not), you still
competently, perspectivally, aim at knowledge. In cases of failure, the vir-
tuous epistemic agent competently, albeit mistakenly, believes as she does
because she competently takes so believing to be a way of knowing. Her
failure does not reflect badly on how she was proceeding; she was merely
unlucky.41As such, she still properly values knowledge as the aim of her
performance.
We now have what are plausibly necessary and sufficient conditions for
properly valuing knowledge in believing as one does, and so for rational
belief: in cases of rational belief one believes in a certain way because one com-
petently takes that way to be a way of knowing. In so doing, one properly values
knowledge as the aim of one’s belief. Just as in the case of externalist justifica-
tion, the mental performance that satisfies this requirement differs in the
cases of knowledge and rational false or Gettiered belief. When the exer-
cise of competence is a manifestation, the agent believes in a certain way
because it is a way of knowing. When the exercise of competence is degen-
erate, the agent believes in a certain way because she competently (albeit
mistakenly) takes a way of believing to be a way of knowing. In both cases,
the agent properly practically values knowledge as the aim of her perfor-
mance because she competently takes the way in which she believes to be
a way of knowing.
This account of proper valuing knowledge in believing as one does al-
lows us to distinguish the virtuous epistemic agent from the merely well-
meaning and virtuous agents in mental terms. The merely well-meaning
agent is not epistemically competent: she is not disposed to believe in cer-
tain ways because those are ways of knowing. As such, even though she
cannot tell that she is failing to know, she does not competently aim, and
so does not properly value her aim in the sense at issue. 42
40See e.g. Palmer (1999).
41This discussion is closely related to interesting issues of direction of fit which I cannot
get into here.
42Of course, sometimes one might be faultless for failing to have a competence—perhaps
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The view I am advocating does claim that there is a kind of faultless-
ness in cases of rational false or Gettiered belief, and so one might wonder
whether it falls prey to the objections I made against appeal to excuses
in the introduction. However, this new approach is importantly different.
First, it explains why certain cases are faultless by appeal to what is going
well in the situation, namely that the agent exercises her competence. Be-
cause the agent exercises her epistemic competence (albeit degenerately),
she properly values knowledge as the aim of her performance in believing
as she does. Even in the degenerate case her belief is by nature a good can-
didate for knowledge because it manifests proper valuing of knowledge as
the aim of her belief.
The account also explains why indiscriminability from cases of knowl-
edge seems to matter, and why (only) certain cases of mere indiscrim-
inabilty are faultless. When the indiscriminability is due to an epistemic
competence being exercised, the agent competently takes a certain way
of believing to be a way of knowing. These are the only cases of indis-
criminability that are cases of rational belief. We can thus distinguish the
merely well-meaning epistemic agent from the truly rational one.
Lastly, the account of rationality on offer here presents it as importantly
the same in kind as externalist justification. Exercises of epistemic compe-
tence are the good candidates for knowledge, both in an externalist and an
internalist sense. When an agent exercises her epistemic competence, she
believes in a way that is thereby likely to be knowledge (externalist sense),
and she also believes in a way that properly values knowledge as her aim
(internalist sense). Moreover, these two features are not independent of
one another. It is no accident that the beliefs that are externalist-justified
are also internalist-justified, because the very facts that are constitutive of
competence possession determine both the reliability of one’s exercises and
the features of one’s epistemic perspective. As such, it avoids the problems
set out in the introduction for theories on which rational false or Gettiered
belief is excusable failure.
5 Conclusion: Diagnosing the New Evil Demon Problem
So far, I have explained the difference between epistemically virtuous, vi-
cious, and merely well-meaning agents in the actual world. But how does
because of a developmental situation. But we can distinguish these two kinds of faults just
like we can distinguish two kinds of luck: there’s (bad) luck you have for failing to have
have certain competences, and then there’s (bad) luck you have for failing to manifest the
competences you do have. Only the latter are directly relevant to epistemic standing.
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this relate to our original question, namely solving the new evil demon
problem? The perspectival duplicates are brains in vats, and so don’t have
any epistemic competences that satisfy the requirements of direct virtue
epistemology (they are completely unreliable).
However, recall section 1. There I claimed that in considering the evil
demon scenario, we are conceiving of a case where the subject’s epistemic
perspective remains the same even though her reliable connection to the
world is severed. This teaches us that epistemic agents have a certain kind
of epistemic standing in virtue of their mental lives, and not directly in
virtue of their reliable connections to the world. A solution to the new
evil demon problem requires explaining the epistemic differences between
cases of rational and irrational belief in terms of the subject’s mental per-
spective. If we have good reason to think that the evil demon scenario
is metaphysically impossible, we do not need to appeal to features of the
subjects’ mental lives that (metaphysically) could obtain in the evil demon
scenario.
As discussed in that section, I doubt that any account of internalist jus-
tification will be able to explain the difference between the virtuous and
merely well-meaning duplicates in a way that avoids appeal to mental fea-
tures that cannot be had in the evil demon scenario. This is for the simple
reason noted above, that what counts as good reasoning (except for logical
cases) depends on what it takes to get onto the facts in the agent’s world.
Inductive, abductive, and heuristic kinds of reasoning are all good or bad
in large part because of how the world outside one’s head is.
On a knowledge-first virtue-theoretic approach, this is to be expected.
Competences to know are fundamental to epistemic evaluation. We cannot
explain what makes a belief rational except in terms of what is required
for knowledge. Although properly valuing the valuable is a distinctively
first-personal phenomenon, then, and part of one’s mental life, it is not
independent from one’s relation to the facts. There are mental differences
between the virtuous, vicious, and merely well-meaning duplicates, but in
order to explain them we need to appeal to how these agents are situated
in their worlds.
If this is correct, then we may reject the metaphysical possibility of the
evil demon scenario in a motivated way. The mental feature constitutive
of epistemic rationality—proper valuing of knowledge as the aim of one’s
performance—could not be had in the evil demon scenario. However, as
long as we are allowing that the evil demon scenario has perspectival du-
plicates, we allow ourselves the metaphysical impossiblity that the subject
believes in a way that properly values knowledge, even though she is not
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reliably hooked up to the world. It is important, then, that the evil de-
mon scenario is metaphysically impossible, but not in the way we origi-
nally might have supposed. We do not get to reject the case as irrelevant to
our epistemic theorizing. We do, however, allow ourselves to appeal to the
agent’s connection to the world when explaining the differences between
various first-personal perspectives.
By accepting the world-dependence of our perspectival lives, we arrive
at a unified virtue epistemology. We can explain what justification and ra-
tionality have to do with one another, and with knowledge. We can also
answer a question that has long been plaguing internalists, namely why
certain well-meaning agents are rational, and others not. This problem
seemed intractable, I will now suggest, because we were supposing epis-
temology to be independent of philosophy of mind. We were assuming
that we could put aside discussion of how the world contributes to our per-
spective on it in discussing epistemic standing, but we cannot do so. Our
connection to the world does not merely reliably hook us up to it, so that
we “produce” beliefs that are likely to be true; it provides us with the kind
of grip on the world that can guide us, from our own perspectives, towards
knowledge.
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